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VOTING FOR FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN THE 2014 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS
The primary goal of the present research note is to concentrate
on the electoral performance of far-right parties in the 2014 Eu-
ropean Parliamentary elections in order to interpret the aspects
of this vote through the bidirectional relationship between the de-
mand-side and supply-side explanatory accounts. According to the
demand-side perspective, we discuss to what extent a range of so-
cioeconomic issues affected the electoral dynamic of the far-right
parties in the latest European elections. At the same time, our re-
search purpose concentrates on the external supply-side develop-
ments in terms of how the positions of mainstream parties across
several ideological aspects and the subsequent configuration of par-
ty competition create electoral opportunities for the far-right par-
ties. More specifically, by comparing the views of the electorally ma-
jor centre-right, centre-left and far right parties across the dimen-
sions of immigration and redistribution of wealth, we ascer tain how
the configuration of party competition influences the electoral de-
cision of voters towards the right-wing family. Therefore, the
analysis provides inferences relating to how the interrelationship
between the demand and supply-side framework in conjunction
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with a range of additional control variables contribute to the inter -
pretation of the electoral behaviour of the far-right voter in the
recent European elections.
Introduction
OVER THE LAST FOUR DECADES, European party systems have
been facing the political emergence and the uneven electoral
accomplishments of far-right parties. A considerable number
of scholars have been trying to approach the causes that effec-
tuate the political survival of the far-right party family and the
determinants that contribute to its electoral rise (Golder 2003;
Inglehart and Norris 2016; Georgiadou et al. 2018). Far-right par-
ties have appeared in three different waves in post-war Europe
(von Beyme 1988), a framing that permits to explore the ideo -
logical variations and the uneven electoral course of the far-right
spectrum throughout this period. To illustrate that, the first
wave, which was associated with the neo-fascist movements of
post-war Europe, remained electorally marginal. In the case of
the second wave, which coincided with the emergence of post-
industrialism, far-right parties were surrounded by a contradic-
tory narrative relating to ‘free market’, ‘ecology’, ‘law and or-
der’, ‘security’, ‘identity’ (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). The rise
of the third wave has been accompanied by the gradual elec-
toral prominence of the populist radical right-wing party pole,
which has been assuming properties of an electoral take-off for
some party casesnotably during the last years and irrespectively
of the order of elections. Far-right parties of the third wave have
been cultivating a discourse against the procedure of moder ni -
za tion and globalization by perceiving immigration as a socio-
economic threat and advocating the concept of ‘welfare state
chauvinism’ (Betz 1994). Trying to identify the factors that con-
tribute to the successful electoral course of the third wave, we
could agree that they are associated with the grievances that
rose due to the changes in the social and economic structures
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of Western democracies (Arzheimer 2009). Moreover, the elec-
toral accomplishments of far-right parties could be also linked
to how these parties exploit the political opportunities in order
to approach the electorate (Tarrow 1998). 
In this review, our research focuses on the 2014 European
Parliament elections, which have attracted academic interest due
to the meteoric ascent of Eurosceptic anti-establishment parties
of either a left-wing or a right-wing slant and the consequent
rearrangement of party systems’ traditional structures. More
generally, European elections are dependent on the national
political arena and tend to providethe radiography of the cen-
tral party stage’s directions. Four years after the 2014 European
elections and a few months before the next ones, we have the
research advantage of looking into this electoral process as a
benchmark for the framing of national second-order elections.
According to Reif and Schmitt (1980), this entails the partial
electoral shrinkage of governing parties and the attendant rise
of new, smaller and marginal partiesas voters wish to express
their warning, punishment or protest towards the political es-
tablishment. In this case, even if the previous European elec-
tions were accompanied by the widespread ascent of anti-estab -
lishment parties with radical left and radical right ideological
properties, similar electoral resultshave been also confirmed in
first-order elections.In other words, the national elections that
have been taking place after the 2014 European elections in
every single EU member-state have not entailed the expected
restoration of party equilibrium, a fact that verifies the perma-
nent and ingrained presence of anti-establishment trends in the
current party systems. 
By concentrating our analysis entirely on the case of far-
right parties, we aim to discuss the factors that contributed to
the electoral mobilization of voters towards the right-wing par-
ty spectrum in recent European elections. Could we perceive
the success of far-right parties as an incidental phenomenon
attributed to the advent of the financial crisis? Assessing the 2014
pan-European electoral map compared to the corresponding one
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in 2009, far-right parties recorded an overall success in France,
Austria, Greece, Denmark and the UK. By contrast, far-
rightwing parties had reduced levels of electoral support in the
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Hungary and Bulgaria, or remai -
ned electorally marginalized in several country-cases (Spain, Por -
tugal, Cyprus and Ireland). Therefore, we notice thatfar-right
parties presented remarkable electoral performance not only in
countries which have been hardest affected by the consequen -
ces of the financial crisis. 
Although the 2014 European elections were conducted
amid a multilevel crisis with financial, socio-cultural, political
and European implications, the electoral presence of several
far-right parties could not be interpreted a sa circumstantial and
singledimensional phenomenon. Since many scholars concen-
trate mainly on the demand-side perspectives for the explana-
tion of far-right parties’ electoral success, in this research note
we proceed a step further by not attributing their rise exclu-
sively to grievances (Golder 2016) that tend to activate the so-
cial demand and the electoral availability of voters towards the
right-wing party spectrum. Our research purpose will be to exa -
mine in parallelthe macro-level developments in conjunction
with the context of party competition, in order to approach
and explicate the framework of the vote for far-right parties.
In the next section, we conceptualize the hypothetical ex-
pectations pertaining to how the interplay between the demand
and supply-side context (Mudde 2007) underpins the interpre-
tation of the vote for far-right parties. Consequently, we describe
the formulation of the research design, and the variables and
data sources used for this comparative review. The following
part discusses the results, and in the closing section we pro-
ceed to the conclusion of this research note as regards the
electoral performance of far-right parties in the 2014 European
elections. 
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Formulation of  research hypotheses
Demand-side explanations
In elaborating our hypotheses, which are balanced between the
social demand and political supply-side interaction, the first set
of expectations are dedicated to the macro-level developments of the
demand-side explanations. Even though the electoral accompli -
shments of the far-right pole could also be linked to micro-le -
vel determinants related to the voters’ expression of punishment
or protest towards the mainstream political establishment (Mud -
de 2007; van der Brug et al. 2000), our research concentrates
main ly on interpreting the macro-level perspectives (Ignazi 1992;
Lubbers et al 2002). Through the examination of the macro-le -
vel approximations, which are associated withthe consequences
of modernization, the eventual onset of financial and political
crisis or the escalating of immigration (Betz 1993; Eatwell 2003),
it is argued that socio-cultural and socioeconomic changes tend
to affect the decision of voters and electorally reinforce far-right
parties. The acceleration of the process of globalization and mo -
dernization in conjunction with the impact of de-nationalisa-
tion has been contributing to the emergence of ‘losers of mod-
ernization’ (Betz 1993). The ‘losers of modernization’, who are
not able to adjust to the new socioeconomic and socio-cultural
conditions and feel threatened and insecure given these struc-
tural changes, are apt to the far-right rhetoric. Therefore, the
‘losers of modernity’ are in a continual competition with immi -
grants, since they attribute their economic and social uncertainty
to the presence of immigrants. In this case, we expect that the
effects of the contemporary multilevel European crisis have
been decisively contributing to the electoral ascent of the right-
wing party spectrum. More specifically, one of our primary goals
will be to investigate the correlation between the salience of the
issue of immigration and unemployment and the vote for far-
right parties in the 2014 European elections. Right-wing par-
ties have always invested in the cultivation of an anti-immi-
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grant ideological discourse (Arzheimer 2009), claiming that im-
migration implies among others a rise in unemployment levels.
Hence, we formulate the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The more the voters raise the issue of immigra-
tion, the more likely they are to vote for far-right parties.
Hypothesis 2: The more the voters highlight the issue of unem -
ployment, the more likely they are to vote for far-right parties.
Supply-side explanations
Subsequently, on the one hand, supply-side developments are
associated with the internal parameters, which concern the ideo -
logy and the structures of party organisation (Mudde 2007). On
the other hand, supply-side explanations are linked to external
factors relating to political opportunities (Tarrow 1998). In this
case, our research focuses on a specific aspect of the external
supply-side perspectives, as the second set of our hypothetical
approximations investigate the effect of the configuration of
party competition on the vote for far-right parties. Scholarly re-
search has demonstrated that the political emergence and the
electoral ascent of far-right parties could be affected by the po-
sitions of mainstream parties across specific policy dimensions
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Hence, our research will focus
on the elaboration of how the established party spectrum con-
tributes to the strengthening or weakening of the electoral pre -
sence of far-right parties. More specifically, a potential ideo-
logical convergence between centre-right and centre-left parties
could imply either the creation of political and electoral oppor-
tunities for the far-right party spectrum (Abedi 2002) or the ab-
sence of this correlation (Norris 2005). As voters perceive the
absence of ideological distinction among mainstream parties,
they could express their protest by voting in favour of the far-
right. Moreover, the adoption of a more centrist ideological plat-
form (Var der Brug et. al 2005) by the traditional right in order
to approach the median voter, could contribute to the electoral
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reinforcement of far-right parties or to their electoral shrinkage
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006). In this case, far-right parties ex-
tend their political space and prevent the eventual ideological
expropriation of their agenda by the mainstream right party.
In this research note, our interest concentrates on the in-
vestigation of how the distance between mainstream parties (cen-
tre-right and centre-left) and the mean voter position across
a range of policy dimensions could affect the vote for far-right
parties. In other words, we are interested in examining if the
divergence of mainstream from the mean voter position could
contribute to the maximization of the electoral gains of far-
right parties. Our model will be implemented in a two-di-
mensional framework in which we investigate the distance be-
tween mainstream parties and the mean voter position across
the economic dimension of the redistribution of wealth and the
socio-cultural one of immigration. It is argued that the transition
to post-industrialism and the acceleration of the realignment
process given the emergence of new divisions relating to the
procedure of globalization and the attendant impact of dena-
tionalization have been contributing to the salience of the socio-
cultural policy dimension (Inglehart 1997). Therefore, we posit
the following set of complementary hypotheses, namely that:
Hypothesis 3: The further away from the voter centre-right par-
ties (Christian Democrats/Conservatives) position themselves
on immigration, the higher the chances that the voter will vote
for a far-right party.
Hypothesis 4: The further away from the voter centre-left par-
ties position themselves on the redistribution of the wealth, the
higher the chances that the voter will vote for a far-right party.
Research Design and Data
This research note in question aims to explain the vote for the
far-right party family in the recent European Parliamentary elec-
tions by concentrating on the socioeconomic framework and
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the aspects of party competition. To measure the dependent vari-
able, namely the vote for far-right parties, we use the 2014 Eu-
ropean Election Study and specifically the post-electoral Voter
study, and create a new variable in which we enclose exclusive-
ly the vote for the electorally powerful and EU parliamentary
right-wing parties of every single member-state. Therefore,
even though most far-right parties represent the populist radi -
cal right pole, we also incorporated two parties derived from
the extremist right current, namely Jobbik and Golden Dawn,
which are electorally the most influential parties of the far-right
spectrum in Hungary and Greece respectively. More specifically,
the parties included are Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
in Austria; Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium; Front National (FN)
in France; Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark; True Finns (PS)
in Finland; Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) in Germany; Χρυ-
σή Αυγή in Greece (XA); Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della
Padania (LN) in Italy; Patij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in Nether-
lands; Sverigedemok raterna (SD) in Sweden; United Kingdom
Impendence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom; Prawo i
Sprawiedliwo[ (PIS) in Poland; JOBBIK in Hungary; Nacionālā
Apvienība (LNNK) in Latvia; ATAKA in Bulgaria; Partija Tvarka
Ir Teisingumas (PTT) in Lithuania; Slovensk á Národná Strana
(SNS) in Slovakia.
Regarding the independent variables, for the first set of
hypotheses that relate to the socioeconomic framework we use
the Voter Study by recoding the variable ‘What are the issues
which make you vote in the recent European elections? Firstly?’
and creating a new variable in which we include exclusively the
issue of immigration and unemployment. The selection of this
variable is not random, as our research purpose is to examine
a variable that is inseparably and directly associated with the
formulation of electoral behaviour and the final voting decision
of the electorate. Our research focuses on the demand-side per-
spective by investigating how the electorate highlight the issue
of immigration and unemployment and the level of correlation
between the vote for far-right parties and the salience of these
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1. The dataset of the Euro-manifesto Study does not provide the ideo -
logical positions of each party along the axis of the redistribution of wealth
and the corresponding one of immigration. This leads to the emergence of
research difficulties since the use of a non-single dataset, which is com-
posed by the Euro-manifesto Study and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys,
might imply the partial redirection of the results. 
2. In order to calculate the distance between parties and voters, we pro-
ceeded to the following steps. First, we converted the 11-point scales – rela -
ting to the positions of voters (Voter Study) and the placements of parties
that were derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) across the
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specified issues. Next, we assess the second set of assumptions,
which examine the role of the supply-side context. By concen-
trating on the configuration of party competition, we measure the
ideological distance between the electorally major mainstream
parties and far-right parties and voters on a two-dimensional
policy space, relevant to the issue of immigration and the redis-
tribution of the wealth. In this case we use data derived from
the Euro-manifesto Study and the Voter Study in order to de-
tect the ideological placements of parties and voters across the
socio-cultural (vertical axis) and socioeconomic dimension (hori -
zontal axis). Given that the Euro-manifesto dataset presents
limitations1 (Krippendorff 2004; Budge et al. 2001) regarding
the ideological positions for every single party, we proceed to the
use of Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) to identify the ide-
ological imprints of every single party-case. For the economic
dimension, we use the question, ‘Pro redistribution of wealth-no
redistribution of wealth’ and for the socio-cultural dimension
the question ‘No restrictive immigration policy-Pro restrictive
immigration policy’. The scale of both dimensions ranges from
1 to 10, where ‘1’means fully in favour of the redistribution of
wealth and the adoption of a non-restrictive immigration poli-
cy and ‘10’ means entirely opposed to the redistribution of wealth
and toa favourable immigration policymaking stance. The mea-
surement of the ideological distance is derived from the squared
difference between parties’ mean placements and voters’ mean
position across both policy dimensions.2 Moreover, the incor-
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dimension of immigration and the dimension of the redistribution of
wealth– to 10-point scales as to assure the point similarity among our scales
(the ideological positions of parties that were derived from the Euro-mani -
festo dataset were already measured on a 1-10 scale). By calculating the mean
position of the centre-right, centre-left and far-right party groups across the
dimension of immigration and the dimension of the redistribution of wealth,
then we followed the same procedure in order to detect the mean voter po-
sition across these specified dimensions. The computation of the ideologi-
cal distance arises through the squared difference between the mean voter
position and the mean placement of each party family.
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poration of several additional control indicators of how the in-
dex of Euroscepticism, the effect of dissatisfaction against the
political establishment and the strength of partisanship con-
tribute to the interpretation of the vote for the right-wing par-
ty spectrum.This model concludes with the inclusion of several
socio-demographic variables with a view to approaching the prop-
erties of the far-right voter’s electoral portrait in the 2014 Eu-
ropean elections. 
The analysis will be based on a quantitative methodologi-
cal approach. Using a linear regression model, accompanied by
two explanatory figures for every set of our hypotheses, we in-
vestigate how the interrelation between the demand and supply-
side frameworkleads to the interpretation of the far-right vote. 
Results and Discussion
The descriptive Figure 1, which accompanies the first set of hy-
potheses,presents the mean value of immigration and unem-
ployment salience in conjunction with the vote for far-right
parties across the member-states of the European Union. Mo -
reover, the determinant of immigration, unlike unemployment,
does not present an equable diffusion across the European ter-
ritory. On the one hand, the issue of immigration is more
salient in Malta and the countries of Northern Europe, such
as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the United King-
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dom. Except for Malta, far-right parties in these countries had
a remarkable electoral presence. On the other hand, the salience
of the unemployment issue is widespread across the European
Union map and particularly in countries that have been hardest
affected by the consequences of the financial recession name-
ly in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and Ire-
land. It has been argued that immigration and unemployment
are interconnected, since far-right parties have been cultivating
a narrative through which the rise of unemployment is attribu -
ted to migration (Golder 2003). Nevertheless, the descriptive
Figure 1 does not reveal sufficiently the confirmation of the
foresaid triptych particularly in the countries of Southern Eu-
rope. Hence, as a future research step, it would be interesting
to investigate the further endogeneity of this relationship by ex-
amining how the number of immigrants in conjunction with
the level of unemployment could create fertile ground for far-
right parties. More specifically, by consulting the descriptive
Figure 1, we observe that the heightened salience of unemploy -
ment particularly in the European South is not associated with
the electoral rise of far-right parties except for the case of Gol -
den Dawn in Greece. The outcome of the 2014 European elec-
tions was accompanied by the electoral ascent of radical left-
wing parties in the countries of Southern Europe, since they
cultivated an anti-austerity discourse of ‘resistance’ against the
international actors that were involved in dealing with the fi-
nancial crisis (IMF, ECB and EC) (Halikiopoulou 2014). There-
fore, we could assume the existence of a stronger correlation
between the vote for radical left-wing parties and the salience
of unemployment, even though the above ascertainment requi -
res additional empirical evidence. 
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FIGURE 1. 
Graphical presentation of the mean value of the far-right vote
and the salience of immigration and unemployment issues across
the EU member-states in the 2014 European elections.
S o u r c e: Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S.B., Popa, S.A., Teperoglou, E., Euro-
pean Parliament, Directorate-General for Communication, Public Moni -
toring Unit (2016): European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter Stu -
dy, First Post-Election Survey. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne.
By concentrating on the evaluation of our hypothetical ap-
proximations, our main findings are summarized in Table 1, whe -
re we observe that the R Squared measure presents a low value
of 18.8%. In other words, 18.8% of the variation in the depen -
dent variable is explained by the independent variables (Lewis-
Beck et al. 2004). More specifically, the first section of this table
displays the dependence of the far-right vote on the macro-level
perspectives of the demand-side context and the concerns of par-
ty competition relevant to the supply-side aspect. This model
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concludes with the exposition of the correlation between the
vote and additional control variables. By evaluating the results
of the linear regression analysis, we confirm the verification of
the first set of hypotheses (hypothesis 1 and 2), since we iden-
tify a strong and positive correlation between the vote for far-
right parties and the salience of the immigration and unemploy-
ment issue. We ascertain the existence of a stronger relationship
between the immigration indicator and the vote towards the
far-right party spectrum – an outcome which verifies that far-
right voters tend to be mobilized largely by the traditional and
most publicized issue of the far right-wing ideological ownership. 
TABLE 1. 
Linear regression model assessing determinants of voting
in favour of far-right parties in the 2014 European Elections.
Coefficientsa
U
ns
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
Model B
Std.
Error Beta
t Sig.
1 (Constant) -.075 .010 -7.283 .000
Demand Side
Salience of Issues
Immigration .332 .010 .274 33.585 .000
Unemployment .057 .007 .068 8.278 .000
Supply side
Distances of party positions
Distance immigration FR -.062 .010 -.064 -6.028 .000
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Distance immigration CR .035 .017 .022 2.026 .043
Distance immigration CL .120 .017 .079 7.035 .000
Distance redistribution FR -.002 .022 -.001 -.079 .937
Distance redistribution CR -.052 .013 -.038 -4.063 .000
Distance redistribution CL .035 .015 .021 2.289 .022
Additional control variables
Reason to vote:
Dissatisfaction .192 .010 .162 19.839 .000
Index of Euroscepticism .015 .001 .099 11.525 .000
Socio-demographic variables
Sex
Reference category: Female
Male .031 .004 .063 7.728 .000
Age
Reference category: 65+
16-24 -.024 .012 -.026 -2.020 .043
25-34 -.016 .009 -.022 -1.770 .077
35-44 -.006 .009 -.009 -.696 .486
45-54 -.003 .009 -.005 -.385 .700
55-64 -.006 .007 -.008 -.774 .439
Educational level
Reference category: 
Higher Education
Primary Education -.005 .007 -.008 -.834 .404
Secondary Education .009 .005 .017 1.767 .077
Profession
Reference category: Retired .010 .009 .010 1.025 .305
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Dependent Variable: Vote for Far-right parties (1 = yes, 0 = no).
By consulting the coefficients table, when the observed p-value (‘Sig.’
abbreviation) is less than 0.05 (bold parameters), then the results,
derived from the correlation between the dependent and indepen-
dent variables are statistically significant.
S o u r c e: Schmitt, H., D. Braun, S.A. Popa, S. Mikhaylov, and F. Dwin -
ger. 2016. European Parliament Election Study 2014, Euromanifesto
Study. GESIS Data Archive and R. Bakker, and E. Edwards, L.
Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen, and
Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S.B., Popa, S. A., Teperoglou, E., European Par -
liament, Directorate - General for Communication, Public Monito -
ring Unit (2016): European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter
Study, First Post-Election Survey. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne.
The following network of scatterplot charts (Figure 2) dis-
plays the positions of the electorally major centre-right, centre-
left and far-right parties in conjunction with the views of the
mean voter on the socio-cultural axis of immigration and the
socioeconomic axis of the redistribution of wealth. To illus-
Self-employed -.003 .009 -.004 -.313 .755
Managers .012 .009 .015 1.352 .177
Other white collars .013 .008 .019 1.565 .118
Manual workers .007 .011 .005 .588 .557
House person .004 .010 .005 .431 .666
Unemployed .011 .013 .010 .797 .426
Students .011 .005 .020 2.256 .024
Strength of Partisanship
Reference category: Very close
Fairly close .005 .005 .009 .989 .323
Merely a sympathiser .053 .010 .055 5.237 .000
N = 13129
R Squared = .188
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3. The scale of both axles ranges from 1 to 10, where ‘1’ means fully in
favour of the redistribution of wealth and the adoption of a non-restrictive
immigration policy and ‘10’ means entirely opposed to the redistribution of
wealth and to a favourable immigration policymaking stance.
FIGURE 2.
Scatterplots charts presenting the positions of parties and voters
on the dimension of immigration and the redistribution
of the wealth in the 2014 European elections.3
S o u r c e: Schmitt, H., D. Braun, S.A. Popa, S. Mikhaylov, and F. Dwin -
ger. 2016. European Parliament Election Study 2014, Euromanifesto Stu -
dy. GESIS Data Archive and R. Bakker, and E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S.
Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen, and M. Vachudova.
2015. ‘2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.’ Version 2015.1. Available on ches-
data.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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trate that, we observe that most of the far-right parties present
a similar anti-immigrant position across the vertical dimension.
Regarding the horizontal axis, far-right parties seem to adopt
either pro-redistribution positions or are located on the median
placement of the socioeconomic dimension, apart from UKIP,
which is entirely opposed to the redistribution of wealth. Cen-
tre-right parties express their opposition to the redistribution of
wealth and tend to adopt median or pro-restrictive immigration
positions, particularly in the cases of the United Kingdom, Greece,
Hungary and Slovenia. Centre-left parties summarize similar
pro-redistribution positions. However, centre-left parties seem
to adopt stricter immigration views in some country-cases na -
mely in Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and Slovakia. Voters present similar and centrist po-
sitions on both policy dimensions. 
Proceeding to the assessment of the second set of hypo -
theses (hypothesis 3 and 4), which concern the interaction be-
tween the configuration of party competition and the vote for
far-right parties (table 1), we ascertain the verification of both
assumptions. Specifically, in the case of the third hypothesis,
we observe that the greater the distance between both main-
stream parties and voters on the dimension of immigration, the
more likely voters are to vote in favour of far-right parties. In
other words,the weakness of mainstream parties to converge to-
wards voters, who adopt more centrist positions across both po -
licy dimension (descriptive figure 2), contributes to the creation
of electoral opportunities for the far-right spectrum. It is worth
noting that the distance of centre-left parties from voters on
immigration is even more statistically significant than the one
of centre-right parties. The adoption of pro-immigrant positions
by the centre-left parties could be interpreted by working-class
voters as support in favour of their competitors in the labour
mar ket. In the case of far-right parties, it seems that the grea -
ter the distance between far-right parties and voters on the di-
mension of immigration, the less likely voters are to vote in
fa vour of far-right parties, since voters tend to adopt a more
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centrist position and far-right parties support the implementa -
tion of a restrictive immigration policy. Far-right parties could
not approach strategically the median voter, as the advocation
of a non-centrist policy agenda signals electoral gains for far-
right parties (Ezrow 2005). In other words, even though the me -
dian voter presents centrist positions, far-right parties are tra-
ditionally surrounded by non-centrist ideological positions, in
order to preserve their ‘raison d’être’ and their issue-credibili-
ty (Spoon 2011), namely the agenda of immigration. Regarding
the final hypothesis, which concerns the distance between par-
ties and voters on the redistribution of wealth, it is argued that
the greater the distance between centre-left parties and voters
across the dimension of the redistribution of wealth, due to the
abandonment of a centrist economic policymaking, the more
likely the voters are to vote in favour of far-right parties. On
the other hand, the larger the distance between centre-right
parties and voters on the axle of the redistribution of wealth,
the less likely the voters are to vote in favour of far-right par-
ties. Even though this finding requires further empirical in-
vestigation, we could explain the above ascertainment through
the switch of most of the centre-right parties towards an op-
posed policymaking stance across the dimension of the redis-
tribution of wealth (descriptive figure 2). Therefore, the adop-
tion of non-redistributive policies by the centre-right parties,
a fact that could also imply the non-socioeconomic favour of mi -
norities, could partially restrict the electoral potentiality of far-
right parties.
Our model concludes with the investigation of additional
control variables. More specifically, we observe the existence of
a positive correlation between the far-right vote and the dissa -
tisfaction of voters, namely the aspect that concerns the nega-
tive assessment of governmental handling. At the same time, we
find a strong statistical relationship between the vote for far-
right parties and the index of Euroscepticism, since far-right
voters tend to empathize with the opposition against the per-
spectives of the European edifice. Concluding with the evalua -
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tion of socio-demographic variables, we ascertain the insignifi -
cant impact of these factors on the rise of far-right parties. It
is confirmed, that men are more likely than women to vote for
far-right parties. The youngest age group between 16 and 24
years, is less likely to support the far right-wing parties compa -
red to the older age groups. Moreover, ‘fairly close partisans’
are more likely to vote for far-right parties than ‘very close par-
tisans’. In this case, given the limitation of the statistical sig-
nificance of the socio-demographic variables we are unable to
confirm the characteristics of the traditional electoral identity
of the far-right supporter over time
Conclusion 
The recent European elections could be considered as evidence
that party systems are undergoing a transformation which has
been taking place since the post-1970s. The electoral ascent of
Eurosceptic, anti-establishment parties with either right-wing
or left-wing ideological inclinations in conjunction with the at-
tendant shrinkage of mainstream parties could not be interpre -
ted as a flash phenomenon, which exploded due to the onset
of the financial crisis. Over the last decades, voters have been
passing through a process of realignment, owing to the decline
of traditional cleavages and the emergence of new concerns
relating to the impact of globalization and Europeanization.
Simultaneously, the wane of political bonds between voters and
mainstream parties has been activating the procedure of dea -
lignment by leading to the electoral abandonment of the poli -
tical establishment and the switch of the electorate towards
new parties. Therefore, the consequences of the multilevel Eu-
ropean crisis did not cause but contributed decisively to the
further redirection of party systems’ traditional structures. Four
years after the 2014 European elections, we could argue that
national second order elections could be no longer evaluated
as the exclusive advantageous arena of anti-establishment par-
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ties and specifically of right-wing parties. During the last years,
far-right parties present an electoral diffusion in national elec-
tions, a fact which verifies that the vote in favour of these par-
ties has been acquiring properties of political endorsement and
does not remain a protest or dissatisfaction vote against main-
stream parties.
The findings referred above indicate that the complemen-
tary relationship between the social demand and political sup-
ply-side account contributes to the interpretation regarding the
aspects of the vote for far-right parties. One of the main goals
of this research note was to investigate the impact of socioe-
conomic and socio-cultural conditions relating to the issue of
unemployment and immigration on the electoral presence of the
far-right party spectrum, since demand-side explanations pos-
sess a deterministic role in the approximation of the far-right
phenomenon. On the other hand, research should not neglect
the effect of the supply-side context on the explanation of the
far-right vote. According to our findings, the configuration of
party competition as regards to how far away or close from the
voter mainstream parties position themselves across the poli-
cy dimensions of immigration and the redistribution of wealth,
seems to contribute to the eventual complication or facilita-
tion of the electoral performance of far-right parties.
Future studies should continue to invest methodologically
on the interplay between the demand and supply-side context
with a view to approaching the far-right phenomenon. In the
case of the demand-side perspective, the future research con-
cern should focus more systematically on how the effect of
cross-national contextual level factors (i.e. related to the num-
ber of immigrants and the level of unemployment) could con-
tribute to the mobilization of the electorate towards the far-
right spectrum. Furthermore, the comparative investigation of
party competition between first and second order elections in
conjunction with the inclusion of more policy dimensions,
which are associated with the issue of the European Union,
could provide inferences regarding the deeper and extensive
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explanation of the determinants that compose the framework
of the far-right vote.
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A P P E N D I X
TABLE A.1.
List of included centre-right, centre-left and far-right parties
Coun-
tries
Centre-Right
Parties
Centre-Left
Parties
Far-right
Parties
Sweden
Moderata
Samlingspartiet
(Moderate
Coalition Party)
Sverige
Socialdemokratiska
Arbetareparti
(Social Democrats)
Sverigede-
mokraterna
(Sweden
Democrats)
Den-
mark
Det Konservative
Folkeparti
(Conservative
People’s Party)
Socialdemokraterne
(Social Democrats)
Dansk
Folkeparti
(Danish
People’s Party)
Finland
Kansallinen
Kokoomus
(National
Coalition Party)
Suomen
Sosiaalidemo-
kraattinen Puolue
(Social Democratic
Party of Finland)
Perussuo-
malaiset
(True Finns)
Belgium
Christen-
Demokratisch
& Vlaams
(Christian Democrats
& Flemish)
Parti Socialiste
(Socialist Party)
Vlaams Belang
(Flemish
Interest)
The
Nether-
lands
Volkspartij
voor Vrijheid
en Democratie
(People’s Party
for Freedom
and Democracy)
Partij van de
Arbeid/Europese
Sociaaldemocraten
(Labour Party)
Partij voor
de Vrijheid
(Party
for Freedom)
Luxem-
bourg
Chreschtlich Sozial
Vollekspartei
(Christian Social
People’s Party)
Letzebuergesch
Sozialistesch
Arbechterpartei
(Luxembourg Socia -
list Workers’ Party)
No Far-right
party
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Coun-
tries
Centre-Right
Parties
Centre-Left
Parties
Far-right
Parties
France
Union pour
un Mouvement
Populaire
(Union for a Popular
Movement)
Parti Socialiste
- Parti Radical
de Gauche
(Socialist Party
- Radical Party
of the Left)
Front National
(National
Front)
Italy Forza Italia
(Go Italy)
Partito Democratico
(Democratic Party)
Lega Nord
(Northern
League)
Spain Partido Popular
(People’s Party)
Partido Socialista
Obrero Español
+ Partit dels Socia-
listes de Catalunya
(Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party +
Party of the Socia-
lists of Catalonia)
No Far-right
party
Greece Nea Dimokratia
(New Democracy)
Elia Dimokratiki
Parataxi
(Olive Tree)
Laikos
Syndesmos -
Chrysi Avgi
(People’s
Association -
Golden Dawn)
Portu-
gal
Partido Social De-
mocrata + Centro
Democratico So-
cial/Partido Popular
(Social Democratic
Party + Democratic
and Social Centre/
People’s Party)
Partido Socialista
Portuguêsa
(Portuguese
Socialist Party)
No Far-right
party
Cyprus
Dimokratikos
Synagermos
(Democratic Rally)
Dimokratikó
Kómma
(Democratic Party)
No Far-right
party
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Coun-
tries
Centre-Right
Parties
Centre-Left
Parties
Far-right
Parties
Malta Partit Nazzjonalista
(Nationalist Party)
Partit Laburista
(Labour Party)
No Far-right
party
Ger-
many
Christlich
Demokratische
Union Deutschlands
(Christian
Democratic Union
of Germany)
Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei
Deutschland
(Social Democratic
Party of Germany) 
Alternative für
Deutschland
(Alternative
for Germany)
Austria
Österreichische
Volkspartei
(Austrian People’s
Party)
Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei
Österreichs
(Social Democratic
Party of Austria)
Freiheitliche
Partei
Österreichs
(Freedom Party
of Austria)
UK Conservative Party Labour Party
United
Kingdom Inde-
pendence Party
Ireland Gaelic Nation
- Fine Gael
Irish Labour Party
- P΅irtí an Lucht
Oibre
No Far-right
party
Bulga-
ria
Grazhdani za Evro-
pejsko Razvitie na
(Bulgaria Citizens
for European Deve-
lopment of Bulgaria)
Balgarska Socia-
listicheska Partija
(Bulgarian Socialist
Party)
Ataka
(Attack)
Croatia
Right Coalition
(Hrvatska Demokra-
tska Zajednica +
Hrvatska Seljačka
Stranka + Hrvatska
stranka prava Ante
Starčevič) 
(Right Coalition
Croatian Democrat-
ic Union + Croatian
Peasant Party +
Croatian Party of
Rights Dr. Ante
Starčević)
(Socijaldemokratska
Partija Hrvatske +
Hrvatska Narodna
Stranka – Liberalni
Demokrati + Istarski
Demokratski Sabor)
(Left Coalition
(Social Democratic
Party of Croatia +
Croatian People’s
Party - Liberal De-
mocrats + Istrian
Democratic Assem-
bly + Croatian Par-
ty of Pensioners)
No Far-right
party
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Coun-
tries
Centre-Right
Parties
Centre-Left
Parties
Far-right
Parties
Czech
Rep.
TOP 09 + Starostové
a nez΅vislí
(TOP 09 + Mayors
and Independent)
Česk΅ strana so-
ci΅lně demokratick΅
(Czech Social
Democratic Party) 
No Far-right
party
Estonia
Erakond Isamaa ja
Res Publica Liit
(Union of Pro
Patria and
Res Publica)
Sotsiaaldemo-
kraatlik Erakond
(Social Democratic
Party)
No Far-right
party
Hun-
gary
Fidesz Magyar
Polg΅ri Szövetség
+ Keresztényde-
mokrata Népp΅rt
(Fidesz Hungarian
Civic Union + Chris-
tian Democratic
People’s Party)
Magyar Szocialista
P΅rt
(Hungarian
Socialist Party)
Jobbik
Magyarorsz΅gért
Mozgalom
(Movement
for a Better
Hungary) 
Latvia Partija Venotība
(Unity Party)
Saskaņa
sociāldemokrātiskā
partija
(Saskanas Centrs) 
(Harmony Social
Democratic Party
(Harmony Centre)
Nacionālā
apvienība
Visu Latvijai! 
- Tēvzemei
un Brīvībai/
LNNK National
(Alliance
All for Latvia!
- Fatherland
and Freedom/
LNNK)
Lithua-
nia
Tćvynćs sąjunga
- Lietuvos krikščio-
nys demokratai
(Homeland Union
- Lithuanian Chri-
stian Democrats) 
Lietuvos
socialdemokratų
partija
(Lithuanian Social
Democratic Party)
Partija Tvarka
ir teisingumas
(Order and Jus-
tice Party)
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S o u r c e: Schmitt, H., D. Braun, S.A. Popa, S. Mikhaylov, and F. Dwin -
ger. 2016. European Parliament Election Study 2014, Euromanifesto Stu -
dy. GESIS Data Archive and R. Bakker, and E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S.
Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen.
Coun-
tries
Centre-Right
Parties
Centre-Left
Parties
Far-right
Parties
Poland
Platforma
Obywatelska
(Civic Platform)
Koalicja Sojuszu
Lewicy Demokra-
tycznej i Unii Pracy
(Democratic Left
Alliance - Labour
Union)
Prawo i Spra-
wiedliwość
(Law
and Justice)
Roma-
nia
Partidul Național
Liberal National
(Liberal Party)
Partidul Social
Democrat + 
Uniunea Națională
pentru Progresul
României + Par-
tidul Conservator
(Social Democratic
Party + Democratic
and Social Centre +
People’s Party) 
No Far-right
party
Slova-
kia
Krestansko-
demokratické hnutie
(Christian Demo-
cratic Movement)
Smer - soci΅lna
demokracia
(Direction - Social
Democracy)
Slovensk΅
n΅rodn΅ strana
(Slovak Natio-
nal Party)
Slove-
nia
Slovenska
demokratska
stranka
(Slovenian
Democratic Party)
Socialnih
demokratov
(Social Democrats)
No Far-right
party
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TABLE A.2.
Electoral results of far-right parties
in the 2014 European Parliament elections
S o u r c e: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-
results-2014.html
Country Party Electoralresult
Number
of MEPs
Sweden Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats) 9.7 2
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) 26.6 4
Finland Perussuomalaiset (True Finns) 12.9 2
Belgium Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) 4.1 1
The
Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) 13.2 4
France Front National (National Front) 24.85 24
Italy Lega Nord (Northern League) 6.2 5
Greece Laikos Syndesmos - Chrysi Avgi 
(People’s Association - Golden Dawn) 9.4 3
Germany Alternative für Deutschland 
(Alternative for Germany) 7.04 7
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
(Freedom Party of Austria) 19.7 4
UK United Kingdom Independence Party 26.6 24
Hungary Jobbik Magyarorsz΅gért Mozgalom 
(Movement for a Better Hungary) 14.7 3
Latvia
Nacionālā apvienība Visu Latvijai! 
- Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK National
(Alliance All for Latvia! - Fatherland
and Freedom/LNNK
14.3 1
Lithuania Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas
(Order and Justice Party) 14.25 2 
Poland Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) 31.8 19 
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